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procedural arbitrability, there is language within those decisions to the effect
that the question of procedural arbitration should not be handled any dif-
ferently from questions of substantive arbitrability. A party may not only
wish to preclude arbitration of certain matters, but also to preclude it when
certain procedures for presenting it are not followed. The test is the same.
The court should determine whether the party seeking to bar arbitration
because of procedural non-compliance has succeeded in drafting a procedural
provision which satisfies the explicitness test.
PHILIP H. GRANDCHAMP
Labor Law—Public Utility Anti-Strike Act—Invalid Under NLRA.—
Street Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri?—On November
15, 1961, the State of Missouri brought suit to enjoin a threatened strike
by employees of the Kansas City Transit Co. which had resulted from an
impasse in collective bargaining negotiations. Pursuant to the provisions
of the King-Thompson Act,2 the Governor of Missouri had seized the transit
company on November 13,3 the day on which the strike had been called. In
so doing, the Governor proclaimed that all rules and regulations governing
the internal management and organization of the company and its duties
and responsibilities were to remain in force and effect throughout the term
of operation by the state.4 Upon seizure of the transit company by the
state, the strike became enjoinable under a provision of the act making it
unlawful to use the strike weapon as a means of enforcing demands against a
utility after possession has been taken by the states From an adverse decision
of the Missouri Supreme Court upholding an injunction, the union appealed.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States HELD:
that the Missouri statute authorizing seizure and providing for the issuance
of injunctions against strikes after seizure is in direct, conflict with federal
legislation guaranteeing the right to strike against a public utility engaged in
interstate commerce and thus invalid under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.°
1 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 295.10-.210 (1959).
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.180(1) (1959) sets forth the power of the Governor when a
utility strike threatens. The Governor is empowered where a strike "threatens to impair
the operation of the utility so as to interfere with the public interest, health and
welfare . . . to take immediate possession of the plant, equipment or facility for use
and operation by the state of Missouri in the public interest."
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.190 (1959) provides that "the governor is authorized to
prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter."
5 Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.200(1) (1959) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, employee or representative as defined in this
chapter to call, incite, support or participate in any strike or concerted refusal to
work for any utility or for the state after any plant, equipment or facility has
been taken over by the state under this chapter, as means of enforcing any de-
mands against the utility or against the state.
Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.200(6) (1959) provides that "The courts of this state shall have
power to enforce by injunction or other legal or equitable remedies any provision of this
chapter or any rule or regulation prescribed by the governor hereunder."
o U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 provides that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
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The federal legislation determined to have preempted the field was the
National Labor Relations Act, sections 7 and 13 in particular. Section 7
provides that "employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . .
Section 13 of the NLRA recites that except as otherwise provided in the act,
nothing "shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications on that right."' Section 13 demonstrates a recognition on the
part of the framers of the NLRA that conferring the right to bargain col-
lectively would produce little increase in bargaining strength without the
existence of the correlative right to strike as a means of inducing the employer
to negotiate in reasonable and responsible terms.
Prior to the principal case, a number of Supreme Court decisions
prompted the reasonable conclusion that the National Labor Relations Act
reserved little power in the states to infringe or abridge the employee's
guaranteed right to strike for legitimate labor objectives. The Supreme Court
in Auto Workers Union v. O'Brien° citing several earlier cases,'° declared that
"None of these sections can be read as permitting concurrent state regulation
of peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this field and closed
it to state regulation."H Despite these decisions and this seemingly clear
declaration, the limits of the field occupied by the federal act were still in
doubt. All of the cases decided had involved the right of employees of
manufacturing companies to strike. Still untested was the validity of public-
utility anti-strike laws which made strikes against public utilities unlawful.12
Such state measures were grounded upon the premise that the public health,
safety and welfare required the continued operation of the public utilities.
In the initial challenge to such a measure, the Supreme Court struck
down as conflicting with the federal law the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-
Strike Law," which by its terms, made it a misdemeanor for any group of
public utility employees to engage in a strike which would cause an interrup-
tion of an essential public utility service." The Court in the Wisconsin Board
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any. State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
7 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1958).
8 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. 163 (1958).
9 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
19 Plankton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Bd., 338 U.S. 953 (1950) ; LaCrosse Tel.
Corp. v. Wisconsin Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949) ; 13ethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor
Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
11 Supra note 9, at 457.
12 At the time of the O'Brien decision some 12 states had enacted Public Utility
Peace Acts in various forms including: Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
18 Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
11 Wis. Stat. H 111.50 et seq. (1949).
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case found that in making it unlawful for employees to strike against public
utilities, the state had sought to deny entirely a federally guaranteed right."
The Court stated that "It would be sufficient to state that the Wisconsin Act,
in forbidding peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries covered by the
Federal Act, has forbidden the exercise of the rights protected by § 7 of the
Federal Act." 18
In so holding the Wisconsin act invalid, the Court dismissed the conten-
tion that in construing the federal act a distinction should be drawn between
public utilities and national manufacturing organizations. The Court pointed
out that when the NLRA was before Congress for enactment, a proposal for
separate treatment for public utilities was suggested and emphatically re-
jected!? This led Mr. Justice Vinson, speaking for the majority to state that
"Creation of a special classification for public utilities is for Congress, not
for this Court." 18
With the aforementioned cases as precedent, the Supreme Court was
asked to rule upon the validity of the King-Thompson Act, Missouri's Public
Utility Anti-Strike Law. There were many distinguishing features between the
Missouri statute in question and the Wisconsin law which had been declared
invalid. While the statute in the Wisconsin Board case was a comprehensive
code for settling labor disputes between public utilities and their employees,
the King-Thompson Act was much more limited in application. The provisions
of the Missouri statute were only to be invoked when a local emergency was
deemed to exist." However, the Supreme Court foreshadowed its decision in
the principal case when, in the Wisconsin Board case, it indicated that even if
the Wisconsin statute had been limited to situations involving only a local
emergency, the measure would still conflict with the federal law." The Court
concluded that "Congress has closed to state regulation the field of peaceful
strikes in industries affecting commerce." 21
A second distinguishing aspect of the principal case was the seizure of
the utility by the Governor of Missouri. The federal act specifically excludes
from application of its provisions "any state or political subdivision thereof." 22
The question arose in the principal case as to whether by virtue of the
Governor's seizure of the transit company, the utility had been converted
from a privately owned company into a state enterprise. If the utility were
determined to have been transformed into a state institution as a result of
the seizure, the exclusionary provision of the NLRA would permit infringe-
ment of the employee's right to strike by the Missouri Public Utility Anti-
Strike Law. Mr. Justice Stewart, in speaking for the majority, dismissed the
form of the transformation for substance. He explained that:
Whatever the status of the title to the property of Kansas City
15 Supra note 13, at 394.
H Id. at 398.
17 Id. at 391-92.
18 Id. at 392-93.
10 Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.180 (1959) confers upon the Governor the authority to
determine when an emergency exists.
20 Supra note 13, at 394.
21 Ibid.
22 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) & (3) (1958).
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Transit, Inc., acquired by the State as a result of the Governor's
executive order, the record shows that the State's involvement fell
far short of creating a state-owned and operated utility whose labor
relations are by definition excluded from the coverage of the National
Labor Relations Act. The employees of the company did not become
employees of Missouri. Missouri did not pay their wages, and did
not direct or supervise their duties. No property of the company
was actually conveyed, transferred, or otherwise turned over to the
State. Missouri did not participate in any way in the actual manage-
ment of the company, and there was no change of any kind in the
conduct of the company's business. 23
This was not the first time that seizure had been used to avoid a
strike. In Youngstown Skeet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 24 Mr. Justice Black
firmly rejected seizure as a substitute for collective bargaining when he ex-
plained that Congress, in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, specifically refused to
add a provision authorizing government seizure in cases of emergency. He
reasoned that Congress had viewed seizure in the same light as compulsory
arbitration: an interference with the normal process of collective bargaining
which is so essential to our economic system. 25 Traditionally, the framers of
our federal statutes dealing with labor relations have been guided by the
principle that the solution of labor-management problems must rest upon a
free economy and upon free collective bargaining. Seizure was especially in-
compatible with the federal act in the principal case since it was wholly token
in character, involving merely a paper transfer of possession of the utility and
having as its sole consequence the prohibition of the strike.
In declaring the King-Thompson Act in conflict with federal law, the
Supreme Court has strongly demonstrated that "collective bargaining, with
the right to strike at its core, is the essence of the federal scheme." 2° With
its decision in the Missouri case, the Court has apparently closed the door on
state legislation curtailing the right of peaceful strikes for legitimate labor
objectives in the field of privately owned public utilities.
The Court, in preserving the right to strike, has thus preserved the
"voluntariness" in collective bargaining. The threat of strike, with its harmful
consequences to both sides, gives efficacy to collective bargaining negotiations.
The threat of harm makes bargaining meaningful since it motivates the
parties to think in terms of a reasonable and responsible settlement. Remove
the right to strike and the consequent threat of harm and the motivation to
bargain responsibly no longer exists. An employer who knows that failure to
bargain reasonably will not produce a strike, but, instead thereof, seizure and
prohibition of the strike, has no incentive to contract on any terms but his
own. In short, nullification of the right to strike not only destroys the
strike but undermines the entire collective bargaining process which is
dependent upon the strike weapon for its effectiveness. The Court by its
decision has demonstrated that it will go to great lengths to protect the right
23 Supra note 1, at 81.
24 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
25 Id. at 586.
26 Supra note I, at 82.
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of employees of privately owned companies to strike for legitimate labor
objectives, even where the consequences may be an interruption of a vital
utility service necessary to the public's health and welfare. However, this
does not preclude the state from limiting the right to strike of employees of
truly state-owned instrumentalities. NELSON G. Ross
Labor Law—Secondary Boycotts—Picketing Railroad Right-of-way.—
Carrier Corp. v. NLRB.'—A complaint was filed by the National Labor
Relations Board against Local 5895, United Steel Workers Union, whose
members went on strike against Carrier Corporation on March 2, 1960. Picket
lines had been established and maintained at numerous entrances to the plant,
including an entrance to a railroad spur line on a right-of-way owned by the
New York Central Railroad adjacent to Carrier's property. The spur line was
used to provide rail service to Carrier and other companies. The railroad
tracks were enclosed by a fence, part of which was a railroad gate through
which the trains entered and left the spur. The Railroad's operations were not
disturbed until March 11 when, pursuant to arrangements made by Carrier,
the Railroad attempted to "spot" empty box cars at Carrier's siding and to
pick up loaded box cars. This operation required several passages through the
railroad gate. During this time union pickets at the railroad gate forcibly
sought to prevent the Railroad from servicing Carrier Corporation. The Trial
Examiner found the Union's actions to be in violation of Sections 8(b) (4) (i)
and 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act,2 but the Board
reversed this finding.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit HELD:
picketing of the Railroad's right-of-way where the manifest objective was to
prevent employees of the Railroad from handling goods of the struck employer
in the course of regular delivery and removal operations was a violation of the
NLRA. The Union was not furthering its legitimate objective of publicizing
its dispute in picketing the Railroad, nor were the actions of the Union in-
cidental to legitimate objectives of the dispute.
A review of the history of the interpretation of section 8(b) (4) shows
that the cases can be grouped into those involving disputes at the premises of
the primary employer and those taking place at the premises of a neutral
employer. In the situation of picketing the primary employer's premises many
activities coming within the literal terms of the statute have been found to be
1 311 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 83 S. Ct. 1298 (1963).
249 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6) (4)
(1958), as amended by Pub. L. 86-257, § 704(b). Section 8(b) (4) provides that it is an
unfair labor practice for a union:
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person . .. to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person . . . where in either case an object thereof is
• • •
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in products of any other person... . Provided, That nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing..
3 132 N.L.R.B. 127, 48 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1961).
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